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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of BENJAMIN GLADDEN
Petitioner,
-againstROBERT DENNISON, Chair,
New York State Division of Parole,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-07-ST7751 Index No. 3355-07
Appearances:

Benjamin Gladden
Petitioner, Pro Se
Lyon Mountain Correctional Facility
3864 Route 374
Lyon Mountain, New York 12952
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224-0341
(Kelly L. Munkwitz,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
The petitioner. an inmate at Lyon Mountain Correctional Facility, has cammencedthe

[* 2 ]

instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent made on
January 16,2006 denying petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving
a term of seven years to life for the crime of Criminal Possession of a Weapon, 3rdDegree,
which occurred while the petitioner was on parole. Due to his extensive criminal history, the
petitioner was sentenced as a persistent and violent felony offender. Among the many
arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner contends that the Parole Board’s determination
was arbitrary and capricious and violated his rights to due process. Petitioner alleges that
the Parol Board placed too much emphasis on the serious nature of his crime and his criminal
history and not enough on his institutional achievements, which included the completion of
Phase 111, and ASAT as well as his receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate. In doing so
petitioner alleges that the respondent violated 0 2594 of the Executive Law. Petitioner also
claims that the guideline ranges were not properly considered by the parole board and finally,
that its decision was too vague and conclusory to provide him with an adequate explanation
of why parole was denied.
Addressing a threshold issue, the petitioner, in an affidavit denominated “Motion to
Dismiss Pursuant to CPLR

9 321 l(c),” maintains that respondent’s answer was untimely

served. The Court, however, by letter dated August 29,2007, granted the respondent a one
week extension to serve his answer, to and including September 7, 2007. Respondent’s
papers were timely served on August 30,2007. In view of the foregoing and for the reasons
set forth herein below, the Court finds that the petitioner’s motion must be denied.
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With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to
due process, the Court observes that it has been repeatedly held that a constitutionally
protected liberty interest does not arise under Executive Law 0 2594, since it does not create

an entitlement to, or legitimate expectation of release (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169 [2nd
Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40 [2ndCir., 20011, at p. 44; Paunetto v Hammock ( 5 16
F Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 19811; Washington v White, 805 F Supp 191 [SDNY,
19921). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation.
The arbitrary and capricious argument that petitioner raises requires a little more
analysis. It is well established that “[plarole release decisions are discretionary and, if made
pursuant to statutory requirements, not reviewable” (hlatlcr uf Siiiuguli 1, fiL‘N Y d i Stillc
Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v New York
State Bd. of Parole, 157 AD2d 944). If the parole board‘s decision is made in accordance
with the statutory requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review

(see Ristau v. Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing
of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to

necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000],
quoting Matter d Kusso v. New k’ork State Bd. d P’aruk, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the
absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination
made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
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The statutory requirements are set forth in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A) which
states that:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (I) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview as well as the Parole Board’s decision reveals that, in addition to the instant
offense, attention was paid to such factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his
receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon
release. The petitioner’s allegations that too much attention was paid to his criminal history
and the serious nature of his crime are without merit. It is proper, and in fact required, that
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the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see

Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept., 19941;
Matter of Sinopoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of
Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history

(seeMatter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971;Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez,
254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). Additionally, it is well settled that receipt of a certificate

of earned eligibility does not serve as a guarantee of release (see, People ex rel. Justice v
Russi, 226 AD2d 821 [3rdDept., 19961;Matter of Flecha v Russi, 221 AD2d 780 [3d Dept.,
19851; Matter of Walker v Russi, 176 AD2d 1185 [3d Dept., 19911 lv dismissed 79 NY2d
897).
With regard to the allegation that the Parole Board’s decision was too vague, the
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it
considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see
Matter of Farid v Travis, supra; Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d
653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter oi’Collado L N w YurA S~aicDivisiuii d’PawJc, 287 AD2d
92 1 [3rd Dept., 200 13). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set
forth in the first sentence of Executive Law

5 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v

Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rdDept., 20061).
All that is required of the board is that it make its determination within the parameters
of Executive Law 5 2594 (2) (c) (A). “Where appropriate the Board may give considerable
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weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
Here, the record reflects that the board considered the relevant factors when reaching
their decision on whether to grant petitioner parole. The reasons for the respondent’s
determination to deny petitioner release on parole are set forth as follows:
“Parole is denied. Hold 24 months. Next appearance 1/2008.
Notwithstanding the Earned Eligibility Certificate, after a
review of the record and interview, the Panel has determined
that if released at this time, there is a reasonable probability that
you would not live and remain at liberty without again violating
the law and your release at this time is incompatible with the
welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of
the crime as to undermine respect for the law. The decision is
based on the following factors: Your instant offense, Criminal
Possession of a Weapon 3rdDegree represents a continuation of
your criminal history that includes prior convictions for
Attempted Criminal Possession of a Weapon 3rdDegree and
Attempted Robbery. You were on parole supervision for
Attempted Robbery in the lstDegree when you committed the
instant offense. This Panel notes your positive programmatic
participation since your last Parole Board appearance, including
completion of Phase I11 and ASAT. You have also incurred
approximately two Tier I1 misbehavior reports since your last
6
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Parole Board appearance. He's above the guidelines due to
sentence structure. Continuous involvement with the criminal
justice system. Negative response to past correctional influence.
All commissioners concur."
This decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the
denial of parole and, as such it, satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 (see
Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New
Ymk State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931).
Finally, with respect to petitioner's argument that he has served time in excess of the
guideline range (see, 9 NYCRR 800 1.3), the guidelines "are intended only as a guide, and
are not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each individual
case'' (see,9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division of Parole,
290 AD2d 907,908 [3rd Dept., 20021). Thus, the Court finds that this does not serve as a
basis to overturn the Board's decision.
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and finds them to be without
merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that petitioner's motion pursuant to CPLR 321 1 (c) be and hereby is

denied; and it is
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ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
‘I’his shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this
DecisiodOrder/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry.

I

ENTER

38,

October
2007
Troy, New York

Dated:

erne Court Justice
eorge B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:
1.

3.

Petitioner’s Verified Petition dated April 18, 2007, Affirmation, Supporting
Papers and Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated August 30,2007, Affirmation, Supporting Papers
and Exhibits
Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to CPLR 32 11 (c)

4.

Petitioner’s Reply

2.
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